



ASSESSMENT REPORT LATVIA-OP REASSURANCE DISPERSED OPERATIONS

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Photo Page 10: Joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau (Photo: NATO)

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
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"But deterrence is more than presence and a show of force.

It has to be credible and it has to be grounded in strong offensive capabilities that would be capable of denying an adversary the ability to achieve success through their own offensive actions, before they have been taken."

GENERAL JONATHAN VANCE,
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF;
OTTAWA CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE,
5 MARCH 2020



RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

Table 1 – Summary of recommendations and observations

Serial	Recommendation/ Observation	Description	Reference
A	B	C	D
1	Recommendation	Clearly articulated Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities (ARAs) for all Canadian elements and explicit processes for external coordination should be implemented.	4.2
2	Recommendation	In SharePoint, the delegation—or lack thereof—of permissions may have contributed to multiple instances reported to CJAT of total data loss and a reduced user confidence in system assurance. Permissions management should be reviewed.	4.5
3	Recommendation	As a result of technical limitations to battlefield command and control (C2), liaison capability has taken on a new significance in Battle Group (BG) effectiveness and in Contested, Degraded, and Limited Operating Environments (CDO) ¹ in general. To better utilize this C2 function, liaison officer training should be added to pre-deployment requirements for personnel who will need to fill these roles.	4.6
4	Recommendation	Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) requirements for deployment to this theatre should include Logistic Functional Area Service (LogFAS) training for logistics personnel to ensure that the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) BG is able to operate effectively in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) logistic environment.	5.1
5	Recommendation	The possibility of establishing a Communications and Information Systems (CIS) advisor position within the LAAT should be examined to maximize the potential of Bde command support and to further efforts to improve multinational interoperability.	5.3
6	Recommendation	Caching—as an alternative to traditional Brigade Service Areas—is a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that should be considered for integration into Canadian concepts for operations in CDO.	5.4
7	Recommendation	Personal combat first-aid kits should be issued to all personnel and consideration given to other operational stockholdings in order to reinforce the credibility of a “fight tonight” culture.	5.5
8	Recommendation	With the priority placed upon digitally enabling the BG and its constituent parts, greater analysis is needed to determine procedures for the systems currently employed. These procedures should ensure survivability and relevance during operations in CDO.	5.7
9	Recommendation	Every effort should be made to incorporate Sending Nation (SN) staff into key BG Headquarters (HQ) collective training in Canada.	6.2
10	Recommendation	The component pieces of the BG should be reorganized together at the earliest possible point to maximize the value of the training cycle. If required, an earlier start date for Canadian Forces Task Plans and Operations Orders (CFTPOs) could be examined to facilitate cross-L1 reorganization.	6.3
11	Recommendation	A CIS package that reflects the equipment that is in use with the eFP BG should be provided to the Lead Mounting Unit (LMU) in order to facilitate day one readiness and allow the BG to train as it would fight.	6.4

¹ LGen Rouleau, MN. “Operations in Contested, Degraded, or Limited Operating Environments – CAF Joint Readiness” 19 Nov 2019

Serial	Recommendation/ Observation	Description	Reference
A	B	C	D
12	Recommendation	The CFTPOs for this Operation (Op) should be updated at the earliest possible juncture and the recommendations made in the Rotation (Roto) 11 and 12 Force Generation (FG) After Action Reviews (AARs) should be validated by Canadian Joint Operational Command (CJOC) HQ prior to incorporation.	6.5
13	Recommendation	There were issues with the coordination of the Managed Readiness Training Fleet (MRTF). The cause of this service outage of the MRTF should be examined and courses of action to prevent it from happening again should be developed.	6.5
14	Recommendation	The position requirements for critical posts within the National Support Element (NSE) should be re-examined. Also, the sourcing of some of these positions could be widened to other L1s (such as Associate Deputy Minister for Infrastructure and Environment (ADM (IE)) to obtain appropriately trained and experienced individuals.	6.6
15	Recommendation	Similar to recommendations in the Mali report, personnel deploying in the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) cell should hold a formal targeting qualification, Information Operations (Info Ops) training, and/or at a minimum, time attached to CJOC Joint Operational Effects (JOE). For staff in the S9 targeting should be preferred, whereas Info Ops training/time attached to the JOE should be mandatory.	6.8
16	Recommendation	eFP BG capabilities should be reviewed and the result of these deliberations should be communicated to BG leadership. For further detail, a classified supplement can be provided upon request to the authors.	6.9
17	Observation	It was suggested to CJAT that by better resourcing and leveraging existing NATO intelligence structures—such as the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre and the NATO Intelligence Production Unit—Canada could unlock better information and provide more effect.	4.4
18	Observation	The physical systems that provide access to the data network are not sufficiently mobile. Forward Operating Base (FOB) kits, though useful in static environments, are too cumbersome for a sub-unit that needs to maintain tactical mobility. This equipment cannot move in accordance with BG Notice to Move (NTM) timings.	4.7



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Review	FP	Force Protection
ADM (IE)	Associate Deputy Minister for Infrastructure & Environment	GRP	Graduated Response Plan
ADM (PA)	Associate Deputy Minister for Public Affairs	HN	Host Nation
ARAs	Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities	HQ	Headquarters
ASCC	Aerospace Coordination Centre	IA	Influence Activities
BG	Battle Group	IBTS	Individual Battle Task Standards
BISCT	Basic Intelligence Systems Core Training	ICE	Integrated Capstone Exercise
BMS	Battle Management System	IM	Information Management
Bn	Battalion	IMO	Information Management Officer
C2	Command and Control	Info Ops	Information Operations
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces	IT	Individual Training
CAX	Computer-aided Exercise	JOA	Joint Operational Area
CDA	Canadian Defence Attaché	JOE	Joint Operational Effects
CDO	Contested, Degraded, and Limited Operating [Environment]	KLE	Key Leader Engagement
CFTPO	Canadian Forces Task Plans and Operations Order	LAAT	Latvian Allied Augmentation Team
CIS	Communications and Information Systems	LDP	Leadership Development Programme
CJAT	Commander's Joint Assessment Team	LMU	Lead Mounting Unit
CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group	LogFAS	Logistics Functional Area Service
CONOPs	Concept of Operations	LTF	Land Task Force
CP	Command Post	LVA MI Bde	Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation	MND (NE)	Multinational Division (Northeast)
Comd TFL	Commander Task Force Latvia	MRTF	Managed Readiness Training Fleet
eFP	enhanced Forward Presence	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EMCON	Emissions Control	NCE	National Command Element
Ex MR	Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE	NRF	NATO Response Force
FG	Force Generation	NSE	National Support Element
FMOST	Foreign Military Out-Service Training	NTM	Notice to Move
FN	Framework Nation	Op	Operation
FOB	Forward Operating Base	OPCON	Operational Control
		OPFOR	Opposing Forces
		Ops O	Operations Officer
		O Plan	Operational Plan
		PFEC	Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept



PNT	Precision Navigation and Timing
POLAD	Policy Advisor
P Res	Primary Reserves
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
RiP	Relief in Place
ROP	Regional Operations Plan
Roto	Rotation
SN	Sending Nation
SNR	Senior National Representative
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SOR	Statement of Operational Requirements

STRATCOM	Strategic Communications
TAV	Technical Assistance Visit
TFL	Task Force Latvia
TIMO	Tactical Information Management Officer
TMST	Theatre and Mission Specific Training
TO&E	Table of Organization & Equipment
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
US	United States
VJTF	Very-High-Readiness Joint Task Force

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 This CJAT report was charged with looking specifically at three broad functional areas within Op REASSURANCE as a part of the wider NATO eFP initiative being conducted in Latvia; it is likely to be the first of a number of associated reports focused on this region. This theatre is defined by significant multinational involvement, complex C2 arrangements and an evolving role for the Canadian National elements deployed within it. At the tactical forward edge, the eFP BG is focused on developing its multinational close combat capabilities—which enable deterrence at the strategic and operational levels—in a CDO for which current operating concepts are being developed in Canada. With this focus, Canadian soldiers have built strong, mutually beneficial relationships with NATO allies, developed and in some cases re-learned more traditional war-fighting skills and demonstrated that they are a force for good within the Baltic region. Studies in the country have shown that the local populace feel positive about the CAF playing a lead role in the ongoing NATO activities within Latvia.



1.2 Other national elements, led—for the most part—by TFL are achieving remarkable progress in solidifying complex procedures, making sense of a complicated relational C2 environment and providing essential support to multiple in-theatre agencies and interests. The current structure has only been in place since 2017 and it continues to grow in design and size, presenting different challenges in the theatre of operation. While this report highlights many areas where improvements can and should be made by the CAF, the overall determination, success and professionalism of the deployed force is a credit to the organisation.

1.3 There remain however, several areas within which the deployed force's ability to conduct its primary tasks and warfighting functions is degraded or constrained by limitations, training or equipment deficiencies that are solely owned by the CAF/DND institution.

The synchronization of training within FG is not optimised. Some personnel and/or groupings deploy without all qualifications or training completed; often these deficits have to be corrected in theatre. Op REASSURANCE personnel are deployed to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) via different mechanisms: 3 year OUTCAN, 6-9 month rotations, and also Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs). Personnel with a 3 year posting may be employed within the same environment as personnel on a 6-9 month rotation, but they have completely different pre-deployment training standards. The training requirements appear not to be applied for the role a person is filling, but for the means by which they are deployed to fill that role.

'Training requirements appear not to be applied for the role a person is filling, but for the means by which they are deployed to fill that role.'

A number of pieces of equipment employed in theatre are not available as part of the pre-deployment training packages. Further, some items of in-service equipment and their multinational interoperability impose operational limitations on the fighting force before contact is made or emissions control (EMCON) measures are applied. Insufficient holdings of some first-line supplies are adding un-necessary risk to deployed warfighting members.

1.4 Op REASSURANCE is the largest single operational deployment of CAF personnel at the time of writing this report. The size and the context of the mission is challenging leaders to re-learn how to operate in continental Europe and how to manage the intricacies of NATO command structures in a pre-conflict scenario. Despite some of the areas where this report suggests improvement, the HQ's continued delivery of operational effect in the face of these changing circumstances must be acknowledged.

2. COMMANDER CJOC AREAS OF INTEREST

2.1 Commander CJOC's task to CJAT, based on his visit to Latvia, focused on dispersed operations and centred on the following areas:

2.1.1 Command and Control.

2.1.2 Resilience.

2.1.3 Informing Force Generation.



3. STRATEGIC CONTEXT- NATO

3.1 The eFP initiative—and indeed Canada’s contribution to it—is rooted in Russia’s revisionist tendencies, its growing appetite for the threat and use of force to attain political goals, and its illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and direct support to Ukrainian separatist movements in the Donbas. After the Russian annexation in early 2014, NATO defence ministers drafted a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to enable increased agility of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and enhanced assurance for members on the Eastern boundary of the Alliance. That September, the RAP was adopted during the Wales Summit and included naval patrolling, enhanced joint exercises, and an air policing regime. Canada participated in these measures before formal adaptation at the Summit through Op REASSURANCE with a frigate for patrols, a Land Task Force (LTF) exercising in Poland, and a periodic Air Task Force to conduct policing where needed. However, after two years of conducting these measures the Alliance determined that they were not strong enough to address the evolving security environment on the continent. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO announced that four eFP BGs would be stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with the UK, Canada, Germany, and

4 Multinational Battlegroups

ESTONIA:

United Kingdom
Denmark

France

Iceland

LITHUANIA:

United Kingdom

Belgium

Czech Republic

Iceland

The Netherlands

Norway

LATVIA:

Canada

Albania

Czech Republic

Italy

Montenegro

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

POLAND:

United States

Croatia

Romania

United Kingdom

Legend:
 Framework Nation
 Contributing Nation
 Valid as of 3 September 2019

HQ Multinational Division
North-East
ELBLAG

HQ Multinational Corps
North-East
SZCZECIN



NATO Enhanced Forward Presence

the USA acting as Framework Nations (FN) respectively. Originally comprising of seven nations, the BG (based on a Canadian Bn HQ, infantry, combat support, and combat service support Coys) was established in Ādaži, Latvia in June of 2017 while a Canadian Task Force HQ was standing up in Rīga. eFP BG Latvia now consists of soldiers from nine nations and has gone through five rotational cycles.



3.2 The eFP BG is not a deterrent measure in isolation. As part of the RAP, eFP is an assurance measure for host nations (HNs) as well as a demonstration of Alliance resolve that serves as a baseline on the escalatory road to conflict. Any emerging crisis can—in theory—be responded to by the Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and eventually by the NRF if the scale of crisis dictates. This amounts to up to 40,000 reinforcements as detailed by the Graduated Response Plan (GRP). Thus, in terms of deterrence eFP serves a valuable role in demonstrating collective resolve to activate these measures in the event of threats to HN sovereignty. However, the value of the eFP's capability-based deterrence should not be understated either; each BG contributes significantly to the combat power of the HN military. In Latvia, the BG is considered another Battalion (Bn) of the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade (LVA MI Bde); the first Bn just recently finished mechanizing while the second is still in the process and the third is to be staffed by reserves in wartime. Additionally, the only armour in the country resides in the eFP BG, along with the sole point of aerospace coordination expertise.

'Canada has also established the Latvian Allied Augmentation Team (LAAT), which provides staff expertise in nascent capabilities—such as fires and civil-military coordination (CIMIC)—along with additional operations personnel direct to the Bde HQ.'

Without the capabilities brought by the eFP, the LVA MI Bde would be a much less imposing deterrent to direct conflict. The Latvian government realizes this; indeed they state openly that one of the central pillars of their defence policy is persistent Alliance presence on Latvian soil². Additionally the Canadian Defense Attaché (CDA) reports that all three Baltic States are advocating for increased physical Alliance entities in the region, including the Multinational Division (North) (MND(N)) HQ that is currently standing up in Ādaži and a desired Standing NATO Maritime Group for the Baltic Sea.

² As seen in "Latvia's Security Policy" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, 20 May 2016, <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/security-policy/latvia-s-security-policy>




3.3 Following the Canadian Government's decision to extend its mandate for this initiative and having recently received a revised CDS directive, CJOC will shortly produce an updated Op Order for Op REASSURANCE. This, in addition to the newly developed Regional Operations Plan (ROP) for Europe that has been published by CJOC HQ, will provide important direction and guidance to the deployed force. These capstone documents will be essential in helping TFL and supported national elements


generate a coherent and aligned STRATCOM narrative that is consistent through all levels of the deployed command. Commander TFL (Comd TFL) enjoys considerable mission command space to determine where national efforts can add best value. This has developed useful consideration of and a growing focus on the operational logistics space—which is far from clear—and also a study of scenarios for conflict below the threshold of an Article V response.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL

4.1 Canada's military presence within Latvia is divided across a number of organisations and is responsive to national, HN and NATO chains of command. The national hub of this complex C2 design is Comd TFL and his staff. Because each of these organizations have their own mandates and working environments, differing views on the use of national resources in-theatre were observed by CJAT. Indeed, these differing perspectives appear to have led to a level of misunderstanding between Canadian personnel on what some of the other force elements are responsible for within a national context.

4.2 Some of this misunderstanding could be attributed to a lack of documentary articulation. There is not yet an ARA matrix for theatre, nor is there a TFL Operational Plan (O Plan). Thus, although each unit seems to have a good understanding of what they are accountable for in isolation, the mutual appreciation of command expectations placed upon the other national organizations within theatre could be improved. This situation becomes even more complex when other stakeholders for the theatre become involved. For example, it was reported to CJAT that two different Relief in Place (RiP) plans were developed—one in Canada and one in theatre—during a recent rotation of the BG, causing some confusion and a degree of duplication. Clearly articulated ARAs for all Canadian elements and explicit processes for external coordination are key for optimizing the potential of these elements.





4.3 Although a Canadian is in command of the eFP BG, coordinating its actions is more complex than in many other command relationships. SN troops assigned to the BG are only caveated for three types of role: situational awareness, force posture management³, and STRATCOM. As a result, any task that is perceived to be outside of these areas by the Senior National Representatives (SNRs) becomes a negotiation rather than an order. In the same vein, coordination of support to the BG is achieved by discussion not direction.

“Canadian leadership eFP elements in Latvia takes place in an ask, not task environment”

Comd TFL

These relationships which enable tactical effect are also important at the operational-strategic level, as TFL leads the multilateral eFP BG FG conference. This same “ask, not task” approach must be used throughout this process in order to maintain positive relationships with representatives from SNs, where the risk of a less adroit handling could impact partner nations’ future commitments.

4.4 The aforementioned complexity is evident through the various chains of command that all lead back to the same element: the eFP BG. While the BG is commanded by the LVA MI Bde—a HN element—the Bde HQ is currently caveated for the same functions as the eFP BG to MND (NE). However, the NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) which is tasked with facilitating the inflow of the VJTF and maintaining situational awareness in-country for NATO, reports directly

³ In the NATO context, force posture management is understood to encompass readiness, training, and exercises.



to Multinational Corps (Northeast). In addition, TFL is the Canadian National Command Element (NCE) for the Canadian component of the BG, while at the same time fulfilling FN responsibilities by serving as the lead for all issues raised by SNRs. Parallel to the NCE, the CDA at the Embassy is responsible for aligning Canadian strategic interests and coordinating the military contribution to whole of government STRATCOM activities—an enduring role that predates the eFP initiative.

These disparate chains of responsibility and command have contributed, to an extent, to a stove-piping of some information and indeed of effort in fields where mutual support is possible. For example, the level of analysis resident in the TFL STRATCOM cell is not fully exploited by the S9 at the BG, as there is no direct operational relationship between the two entities to facilitate the flow of information.

The realities of managing intelligence within the NATO construct add challenge to this environment. Much of the intelligence product that Canada has access to cannot be declassified to share with non-FVEY partners. To address this, it was suggested to CJAT that by better resourcing and leveraging existing NATO intelligence structures—such as the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre and the NATO Intelligence Production Unit—Canada could unlock better information and provide more effect. A low-cost, high-reward way to start this may be the contribution of tearline intelligence to these agencies for wider dissemination. However, it was also posed to CJAT that Canadian intelligence personnel currently employed within the various NATO commands subordinate to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe could provide more impact and influence if posted to the aforementioned establishments instead; initial discussions with intelligence personnel posted to the Latvian NFIU lend credence to this suggestion, but further analysis across multiple organizations would be required to substantiate a recommendation.

4.5 Information management practices are another area that appear to require some level of corrective review. BattleView⁵ is employed on classified networks⁶; this presents a challenge when moving information into the NATO space. When employable in theatre, the system is extremely data-intensive.

⁵ Canada's digital Common Operating Picture viewer and battlespace planning tool.

⁶ Although permissions can be granted for international usage in the Canadian Deployed Mission Network (CDMN), complexities within the CDMN gateways provide barriers to actual employment.

Bandwidth requirements to transmit the database and overlays cause excessive lag-time presenting an obstacle to timely employment. Some workarounds have been attempted that all used unclassified data or relied on the Latvian cellular network as a transmission means. These were unsuccessful as they created a single point of failure during conflict escalation or potential warfighting activity.

Permissions management in both BattleView and collaborative workspaces have complicated the delivery of timely information. In SharePoint, the delegation—or lack thereof—of permissions may have contributed to multiple instances reported to CJAT of total data loss and a reduced user confidence in system assurance. Permissions management should be reviewed for this theatre.

4.6 Interoperability between nine different national communications systems within

the eFP BG is complex. The lack of common crypto standards and varied technical solutions to frequency hopping limits the provision of secure communications between sub-units. This problem is compounded by observations reported to CJAT that no digital system seems entirely suitable for the theatre. Although the Spanish are using a Battlefield Management System (BMS) in their vehicles, the only way to leverage the system in BG Command Posts (CPs) is to tether an otherwise fighting vehicle to a static location. Discussions between BG staff and CJAT concluded that the technical effort required would not sufficiently enhance the tactical value. As a result of technical limitations to coordination, liaison capability has taken on a new significance in BG effectiveness and CDO in general. To better utilize this C2 function, liaison officer training should be added to pre-deployment requirements for personnel who will need to fill these roles.





4.7 The physical systems that provide access to the data network are not sufficiently mobile. FOB kits⁷, though useful in static environments, are too cumbersome for a sub-unit that needs to maintain tactical mobility. In addition, the fragility of the equipment and the time required to set up limits its utility. Set up and tear down procedures for the equipment exceed the NTM timings established by the BG.

As a consequence of the limitations of both physical systems and programmes, the master Common Operating Picture is an analogue 'bird table' located in the BG forward CP. Data communications have been limited to the main CP only, where the digital to analogue divide is resident. The BG has adapted extremely well to this situation by embracing more traditional coordination methods such as field phones, runners, and fixed fire plans. However, the limitations of these systems have increased the time required for an HQ to effect battlefield changes, reducing overall agility. To further mitigate this,

the BG Comd issues orders to the entire BG, and multiple Concept of Operations (CONOPs) rehearsals are conducted. This helps sub-units apply mission command to greater effect when denied communications.

"Although the RSM had designated a [Casualty Collection Point] during a BG attack, the message was not passed to all elements. However, because of an SOP that utilized the FASPAC⁸ as an [Ambulance Exchange Point] and the multiple CONOPs rehearsals that detailed the location of the FASPAC, casualties were transported there and 9-liners⁹ were relayed through the FASPAC who did have comms."

OC eFP BG Combat Service Support Company (CSS Coy)

⁷ The equipment which allows forward command posts remote connectivity to the data network and which supports multiple devices.

⁸ A FASPAC is an SOP in common use with both 1 and 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group which sees a planned resupply element carrying primarily Class III and Class V stores (along with medical assets) to resupply the fighting element after an attack.

⁹ A 9-liner is a reporting format that can be used for a number of tactical purposes. Casualty evacuation is one that is typically used to inform the medical station of what kind of injury to expect if the casualty is being evacuated using integral means.

5. RESILIENCE

5.1 There is planned resilience built into the wider eFP initiative, with significant follow-on forces identified in the GRP. However, as this is a NATO Activity and not yet a NATO Operation, the Alliance is not required to provide certain key resources such as common funding and NATO crypto. Despite this current status, NATO has established a separate entity to plan for the potential in-flow of follow-on forces. The NFIU facilitates & coordinates agreements for the VJTF and manages their Statements of Operational Requirements (SOR). While they have no role in planning the operational flow of materiel & equipment, they ensure that all mechanisms are in place to facilitate it. The NFIU employs OUTCAN-posted officers in the J2 and the J4 branches who have no official command relationship with other Canadian elements in theatre.

The ability to integrate into NATO processes enables the resiliency of the eFP BG as the potential for conflict escalates. In the event of GRP activation, the in-flow of materiel and reinforcements will be managed using LogFAS¹⁰. Canada does not use this system except



¹⁰ The supply chain management system used by NATO.

when operating in the NATO context. As such, personnel are not normally trained on the system, nor will they necessarily be exposed to it prior to deployment. CAF requirements for deployment to this theatre should include LogFAS training for logistics personnel to ensure that the eFP BG is able to operate effectively in a NATO logistic environment.

5.2 The Canadian NSE fulfils FN responsibilities by coordinating all of the support requirements of the eight other NSEs and managing them with the HN. This places the NSE Comd in a “Camp Mayor” role while also providing support to the BG. This has created challenges between the FN expectations placed upon the NSE and the priority of support expected by the Canadian LTF. As a result, these expectations have increased the NSE’s scope of work. Indeed, the division of support assets between the BG and the NSE further reflect the complexities of this arrangement¹¹. A high volume of TAVs are required to meet current NSE responsibilities, particularly in the area of technician support for camp sustainment. Although the organization is currently delivering on its wide mandate, there remain questions on how it would function in a situation where the GRP is activated. All of the personnel in the NSE are declared to NATO, however the organization as a whole is not.



5.3 The work to ensure national rear-link and communications with flanking forces is done by the CIS Sqn. Although the Sqn is fully staffed with advisors, many do not have any project management experience. This results in an in-theatre learning curve and an enhanced mentorship responsibility for leadership throughout the Sqn. Additionally, the dynamics of support efforts between the CIS Sqn and the BG need to be re-examined as the Sqn mandate evolves. It was also stated to CJAT that efforts to integrate CIS advisors into the Bde had paid dividends in enabling command support and furthering interoperability. The possibility of establishing a CIS advisor position within the LAAT should be examined to maximize the potential of Bde command support and to further efforts to improve multinational interoperability.

5.4 Operations with the LVA MI Bde have identified both lessons relevant to Canadian work on operating in CDOs and complexities in integrating specialist capabilities into a smaller military construct. The current

¹¹ For example, all clerks, cooks, contracting, camp engineering, and medical support is held by the NSE while second line maintenance is held by the BG.



supply methodology used by the LVA MI Bde relies upon static caches of equipment and contracting for movement of materiel. This was a result of observations on Bde exercises where it was determined that the large Bde Service Area would quickly become an indirect fire target.

‘Caching is an SOP that should be considered for integration into Canadian concepts for operating in a CDO.’

However, the reliance on contracting introduces risk in a GRP scenario. As the existing LVA CSS Bn is smaller than a Canadian CSS Coy, it was reported to CJAT that the LVA MI Bde would like to see all NSEs integrated in some form into their Svc Bn in the future. The eFP BG HQ currently holds capabilities not yet established in the Latvian Army and there is much discussion on how to best use these assets. For example, the Airspace Coordination Centre (ASCC) in the BG HQ has been identified as a potential force-multiplier if employed in the Bde HQ.

5.5 The eFP BG constitutes a substantial amount of the LVA MI Bde’s combat power. Although a “fight tonight” mindset has been instilled into the BG’s culture; a robust quantity of supplies is held by the unit; and they can currently hold all of their ammunition “on wheels”, the disposition of Canadian indirect fire assets in theatre is not optimized to provide support to the BG during conflict or crisis. Additionally, not every member of the BG is issued a first-aid kit and there are no Canadian holdings of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear defence equipment. At a minimum, personal combat first-aid kits should be issued to all personnel and consideration given to other operational stockholdings in order to reinforce the credibility of a “fight tonight” culture.

5.6 Despite the importance placed on intensive rehearsals, there still exists some real-life support considerations that limit eFP BG freedom of action. Since the United States (US) military owns a number of pieces of infrastructure in Ādaži, they have the first right of refusal for the use of these facilities. In addition, the training area sizes are limited. Not only does this cause prioritization

¹² CJAT recognizes that this capability is undeclared to NATO; however it is understood that the original intent of the forward staging of this equipment was to fill the indirect fire capability gap. A classified supplement regarding this disposition can be provided upon request to the authors.

pressures when US forces arrive for training, it bounds the area available to the eFP BG to rehearse dispersed operations. Additionally, the BG provides the entire range safety net for the training area. This task takes signallers out of their tactical roles to facilitate exercise activity; consideration should be given to other means to provide this service. However, it is not just exercises that are impacted by real-life support. Mental health is a key enabler of operational readiness and a current CAF priority. Within theatre, the padre is the only person working in this capacity; this position is not backfilled during Home Leave Travel Assistance.

5.7 As systems evolve and the focus continues to be on data communications, there

are other factors that need to be considered to improve resilience. Currently, the LVA MI Bde CP is about 1/16 the size of a Canadian Bde CP, allowing it much greater mobility, and given the threat, survivability from indirect fire. These lessons being identified in theatre provide an opportunity for the potential revision of Canadian CP design and TTPs as the concept for operating in CDOs matures.

NTM timings are a critical procedural tool in ensuring the survivability of a CP. However, the doctrinal NTM used in BG SOPs does not enable CP mobility before the current threat's assessed sense to strike cycle has been completed. NTM timings should be re-examined based on the latest threat assessments.



“Given the current systems in theatre and the delay of TOPAZ¹³ for the foreseeable future, how do we survive with the systems we have?”

CO CIS Sqn

With the priority placed upon digitally enabling the BG and its constituent parts, greater analysis is needed to determine procedures for the systems currently employed.

These procedures should enhance survivability and relevance during operations in CDOs.

5.8 Although FGs are delivering the required personnel for the mission now, the resilience of these national institutions is a critical factor in the sustainability of support to this theatre.

During the two months following redeployment from this mission, the majority of senior leadership within the 1st Canadian Mechanized Bde Group (CMBG) HQ & Signals Sqn were either on leave or deployed. Additionally, during the 1 CMBG High Readiness Cycle every single Bn Signal Officer as well as 13 of 17 Bde Signal Officers will have deployed. There is a similar rate of deployment for the tradespeople under these officers. This limits the ability of the Bde to mount the necessary



signals support to domestic operations in Western Canada to single events. As there is a possibility that deployment numbers may increase, there is a need for enhanced processes to source personnel outside the High Readiness unit for augmentation, including from the reserve force. This could also have the benefit of providing access to expertise that does not usually reside in the Bde—such as garrison support and project management skills.

“If we say that we want to fight in a contested environment, we have to understand what that means for the institution.”

CO CIS Sqn

¹³ This Capability Package includes tools that facilitate the central connection and network functions for all radio, intercom, applications, and user services.

6. FORCE GENERATION & CAPABILITY

6.1 Although it is widely acknowledged that Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE (Ex MR) and the Bde-level lead up to it is relevant training to the Canadian elements of the eFP BG, this training regime could be modified to deliver a more ready force to theatre. Additionally, Ex MR is not the ideal training solution for some of the other elements in theatre who participate; this results in over-training for some, while other theatre positions have no mandated training requirements beyond Individual Battle Task Standards level 1 before deployment.

6.2 Theatre-wide consensus is that Ex MR and Bde preparation provides necessary pre-deployment training and experience with conventional warfighting scenarios. However, CJAT was made aware that there is some resistance to modifying existing exercise components that would potentially increase value and relevance to the LTF. The current structure of Canadian FG activities is not optimized for the participation of SN staff in some key training events. Because of the criticality of the SN staff to the BG HQ, such integrated training could accelerate the in-theatre 'storm-form-norm' process.





This SN staff participation should be designed into Ex MR¹⁴. It needs to be highlighted that early integration with SNs in the FG process has been an important part of FG AARs since Roto 10. Roto 11 conducted a computer-aided exercise (CAX) with seven of their eight SNs which was extremely successful.

In addition, some friendly force capabilities used on Ex MR are more robust than those positioned in theatre. For example, during this training Health Services and Support is exercised with the full capability of a field ambulance while servicing the fighting units. However, the eFP BG only has access to a Unit Medical Station in theatre. Additionally, the relatively uninterrupted communication network at home grants manoeuvre elements unrealistic flexibility in adapting C2 measures—such as fire plans—to changes in the situation. In order to address the asymmetry between exercise and theatre experience without disrupting

too much of the existing exercise architecture, it was suggested to CJAT that placing the Bn acting as Lead Mounting Unit (LMU) for the Op REASSURANCE LTF in the opposing force (OPFOR) role could be examined. OPFOR has been observed by the previous rotation to have more flexibility in determining the pace of and manner in which operations are conducted¹⁵ on the exercise which may better allow a Bn to reflect the realities of the operational theatre¹⁶.

6.3 When formed units are reorganized or augmented prior to deployment, the positive effect of previous collective training is diluted. In the eFP BG, the Road to High Readiness and Theatre and Mission-Specific Training (TMST) did not include all of the individuals who eventually deployed. Although a number of augmentees from the Primary Reserves (P Res) joined the Bn in the months before deployment, administration timelines and the relatively late issue

¹⁴ As agreed upon in the Framework Nation Integration Order (para 9, (e), i.)

¹⁵ This statement is made acknowledging the value of experience with flanking units that is gained by operating as Primary Training Audience.

¹⁶ CDS Directive 004 Para 30.

of authorization for class C contracts caused many individuals to miss TMST.

“Ops URS for receiving reservists was a nightmare. We had reservists missing out on valuable training [for administration] to get Class-C ready”

BG Ch LO/S9 & Bn Adjt
on HR training

However, even this level of integration was missed for some of the Regular Force individual augmentees, who did not join the BG until arriving in theatre. The mechanics of re-grouping have been a component of all three FG AARs and all concur that an early re-group that would facilitate maximum collective mission-specific training is essential. The component pieces of the BG should be reorganized at the earliest possible point to maximize the value of the training cycle. If required, an earlier start date for CFTPOs could be examined to facilitate cross-L1 reorganization.

6.4 Pre-deployment training for CIS in direct support to the BG did not sufficiently meet the reality of in-theatre needs. Because of the highly specialized nature of in-theatre CIS equipment, generalized training does not properly prepare a signals tradesperson to do their job in this deployed environment. Driven by the unique needs of the eFP BG—which were elaborated upon in chapter 4—specific equipment exists only for in-theatre use. This equipment does not have a pre-deployment training package associated with it in Canada. A CIS package that reflects the equipment that is in use with the eFP BG should be provided to the LMU in order to facilitate day one readiness and allow the BG to train as it would fight.



Additionally, official lines of coordination between the FG signals element and the CIS Sqn may prove useful in preparing personnel with best practices for theatre.

6.5 CFTPO, position sourcing and other central support functions have presented challenges in the FG process. When the LMU for Roto 12 received the CFTPO brique, the only individual training (IT) requirements identified for the vast majority of positions were Gender-Based Analysis+ and NATO Advanced Distributed Learning 169 (Integrating Gender Perspectives). This is an issue that persisted from the previous Roto and a list of recommended IT was provided in their FG AAR. However, these recommendations were not incorporated into the brique received by Roto 12. Thus, Roto 12 implemented these IT recommendations solely based on the previous FG

AAR. This lack of control over the qualifications held by deploying members is problematic; the CFTPOs for this Op should be updated at the earliest possible juncture and the recommendations made in the Roto 11 and 12 FG AARs should be validated by CJOC HQ prior to incorporation. However, delegation of control of the positions themselves was also an issue. The LMU did not have access to those positions from other units once they were filled and thus had to pull information for qualification verification from the members' home units or from the members themselves. These issues highlight the need for earliest possible reorganization. Qualification identification aside, there were also issues with identifying personnel for certain key positions such as Senior Intelligence NCO¹⁷ and Medical Officer. Often when the LMU attempted to find solutions for filling these positions through informal channels, they were told by units that they could not "give up" the personnel that they had. This indicates that current methodologies for sourcing specialty positions with personnel shortages are not robust enough and alternative measures—such as sourcing to multiple L1s at once or split-tasking positions—should be considered.

There were also issues with the coordination of the Managed Readiness Training Fleet (MRTF). Because a large proportion of the fleet had serviceability issues and lacked prime movers to transport them to the LMU in a timely manner, some drivers deployed to theatre unqualified to drive the vehicles they were being deployed to crew. This led to a large portion of time in theatre being devoted to initial individual training as opposed to collective training, hampering efforts for further integration. The cause of this service outage of the MRTF should be examined and courses of action to prevent it from happening again should be developed.

6.6 FG for the NSE was less theatre relevant than that of the BG. Both Comd TFL and the commander of the NSE described the organization by comparing it to a garrison services formation back in Canada. However, a large number of the staff in the NSE were deployed to Ex MR as part of pre-deployment training. As a result, they were left no time to reorganize into their deployed grouping before arrival in theatre. These integration difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that four key staff members (Deputy Commanding Officer, Contracts, Finance, and Medical Liaison) are

¹⁷ This statement is made acknowledging the branch-wide issues with availability of NCOs within intelligence.

OUTCAN positions—an arrangement entirely necessary for continuity of operations. Indeed, despite the unique role of the NSE in theatre, there seems to have been almost no specific pre-deployment training. Reportedly, the Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) before deployment were ad-hoc and did not impart sufficient understanding of the complex structure of the NSE. Of some concern to CJAT, certain rotational positions—such as the construction engineering officer and infrastructure manager—do not require any previous experience in their specific fields. This could lead to significant financial and project timeline implications. Finally, the Operations Officer (Ops O) for the NSE was not required to hold the Army Operations Course—a requirement for any unit-level Ops O in Canada. As a consequence, CJAT believes that the position requirements for critical posts within the NSE should be re-examined. Also, the sourcing of some of these positions could be widened to other L1s (such as ADM(IE)) to place appropriately trained and experienced individuals into such resource-critical positions.

6.7 During CJAT interviews and meetings with individual staff members, it was clear that there are other cases, particularly in some OUTCAN posted appointments, where

appropriate training or pre-qualification for specific appointments were lacking. This is more apparent in the technically based appointments such as Cyber and Information Management Officer (IMO), and of note, in the targeting and Info Ops environment, where reference to the CJAT Mali report should be made for trend analysis.

The current TFL Policy Advisor (POLAD) received virtually no pre-deployment preparation. Fortunately, his NATO background had equipped him with some of the tools necessary for this appointment. In addition, the POLAD is expected to advise on policy matters during the targeting cycle, yet has received no targeting training, experience or qualifications. This lack of programmed pre-deployment training should be addressed to ensure continuity of support. Similarly, the J2 cell is also tasked with supporting the targeting cycle and it too lacks qualified personnel. The J2 indicated that the KLE conducted before deploying provided only limited insight into theatre goals, policies, and orders and that the Basic Intelligence Systems Core Training (BISCT) course for all J2 staff in addition to the Release and Disclosure Officer Training for the J2 Ops should be mandatory before deployment¹⁸. The LAAT reports similar experiences of pre-deployment



¹⁸ Currently the Intelligence, JISR, and targeting Requirements team in the Directorate of Joint Capability Development ensures that appropriate training is delivered to rotational J2 personnel before deployment and to posted personnel once they are in Latvia.



training. As a 3 year posting attached to a foreign military Bde staff, the current training requirement only mandates Individual Battle Task Standards (IBTS). For such important positions within the LVA MI Bde, recent experience with Ex MR could be of significant benefit as would participation in the Leadership Development Programme (LDP) run for the BG. Although some posted positions do have identified qualification requirements, it appears that losing units are reluctant to allow members to conduct this training before they are posted to theatre. It was reported to CJAT that this was the case for the two Canadian positions working at the NFIU. Although not part of TFL, these positions are influencing the NATO operational space and contribute to the overall reputation of Canada in the country. They are given no mission-specific training or briefings to augment their position requirements and lack familiarization with the NATO environment. Perhaps this is an area where Foreign Military Out-Service Training (FMOST) NATO courses could be utilised to provide NATO posted staff with better multinational awareness.

"I thought I was knowledgeable [about NATO matters] coming from CJOC, but I was blindsided by the challenge of working in the NATO CoC"

NFIU Latvia J4 Staff

Force Protection (FP) staff indicated to CJAT that the Canadian FP course was viewed by the Military Police institution as a benefit but not a necessity for the position. This seems somewhat counterintuitive to a theatre with an elevated risk of potential espionage. It is suggested that the Canadian course should not only be mandatory for FP personnel but consideration should also be given to the NATO equivalent.

The eFP BG IMO was not a qualified Army Tactical IMO (TIMO). In addition, he did not have any information management (IM) background from previous appointments. As the army and the joint force continue to promote IM as a critical

command support tool, it is essential to place the right people with the appropriate qualifications into IM jobs especially where the frictions associated with deployed operations can further challenge this important area.

6.8 The FG for the STRATCOM cell correlated to some observations CJAT made in Mali and thus is of particular interest. Definition of what exact FG activity is necessary for STRATCOM is difficult, as the cell in TFL HQ is the first of its kind. Although a Force Employment Concept is being developed by the Associate Deputy Minister for Public Affairs (ADM (PA)), this concept has not yet been expanded upon to inform what qualifications are required to deliver the desired results. There are very few personnel in theatre that have any linked qualifications in STRATCOM or in the associated field of Info Ops. This problem may in part be caused by the fact that Info Ops, Influence Activities (IA), and CIMIC are all functions that reside mostly

within the P Res when sourced from the CA. It was reported to CJAT that there had been instances of “no-fills” for some of these important positions. Since these P Res “no-fills” are not confirmed until D-45, it is a challenge to change the sourcing and once a replacement individual is selected from the regular force, it follows that there is not enough time to qualify them before deployment. Out of the nine personnel in the STRATCOM cell, only three had qualifications for their position before deployment. Equally, the qualifications in the eFP BG S9 team are mostly CIMIC; however, in the BG context, CIMIC training is less applicable than Info Ops or even IA training. This correlates with CJAT findings on other missions, which possibly signposts a cultural perspective held by the CAF that Info Ops qualifications—among other non-traditional fields of practice—are preferred rather than mandatory for such staff positions. The opposite reality was observed in Mali by CJAT where appropriately qualified Info Ops and Targeting staff were able





to leverage disproportionate and positive effect within a large HQ¹⁹. Similar to recommendations in the Mali report²⁰, personnel deploying in the STRATCOM cell should hold a formal targeting qualification, Info Ops training, and/or at a minimum, time attached to CJOC JOE. For staff in the S9 targeting should be preferred, whereas for Info Ops training/time attached to the JOE should be mandatory.

6.9 Although FG is a critical part of the overall readiness of the eFP BG, equipment is also essential. Because of the confluence of terrain considerations; current Russian units held in the Western Military District; and the current forces in-theatre, the capabilities of the eFP BG are not optimized to fully enable a range of options during a potential conflict. These capabilities should be reviewed and the result of these deliberations should be communicated to BG leadership. For further detail, a classified supplement can be provided upon request to the authors.

6.10 There are some capabilities which Canada is currently excelling in. BG staff expressed no concerns with operating in a Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) degraded environment. Some of the mitigating factors highlighted to CJAT were BG comfort with analogue navigation and well-practiced “iron sight drills” for fires. Additionally, the LVA MI Bde is reported by the LAAT to view their greatest training deficiency as practiced procedures for when systems fail, particularly in the face of EW overmatch. It is evident from after action reviews from Ex MR and from conversation with Comd TFL that there is already an emphasis on this in the Canadian mindset. At the time of interview, Comd TFL was planning to request a Mobile Electronic Warfare Team for the Integrated Capstone Exercise (ICE) that occurred in March. Similar initiatives in theatre should be actively pursued, supported, and enabled by all levels.

¹⁹ Chapter 4, paragraph 4.6 “Assessment Report: Mali-Op PRESENCE/MINUSMA Information Operations” Commander’s Joint Assessment Team, 10 Sep 19.


²⁰ Key Findings and Observations Serial 3, *ibid*.

7. CJAT CONCLUDING REMARKS

7.1 This report completes the third deployment for CJAT in 12 months and the first to Op REASSURANCE. During this visit, the team was able to meet with BG and support staff who were close to completing their tour as part of Roto 12. The realities of a BG conducting dispersed operations in a degraded environment have understandably exposed some challenges, including equipment, multinational interoperability and training. This environment has also highlighted the ingenuity, guile and initiative present within our deployed fighting force units to achieve the mission in spite of these frustrations.

7.2 Latvia represents a complicated C2 structure with national, HN and NATO chains of command all responsible for various elements of Canada's support to the NATO eFP task and the HN. TFL are doing an outstanding job of both leading from a national perspective, but also by nurturing and managing command and administrative relationships with the HN and NATO. This process is not without friction, some of which has been identified in this initial assessment; however the overall impression garnered by CJAT is one of innovation, sound leadership and a determination to develop the mission.

Finally, CJAT has identified benefits to further assessment activity within this operational area. Supported in concept by the Comd TFL, CJAT plans to confirm observations and gather operationally relevant lessons during a BG exercise, examine potential challenges in operationalising the Pan-domain Force Employment Concept (PFEC), whilst also investigating the complex logistic challenge in the event of GRP activation. A second CJAT report on Op REASSURANCE will follow.



8. KEY MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS

TABLE 1 – KEY ENGAGEMENTS/MEETINGS

Serial	Who	Where	When	Contact Details
A	B	C	D	E
1	Comd TFL – Col Éric LaForest	JHQ	10 Dec	Eric.LaForest@forces.gc.ca
2	TFL StratCom – Maj Yves Desbiens	JHQ	10 Dec	Yves.Desbiens2@forces.gc.ca
3	J5-2 – Capt Nick Ethier	JHQ	10 Dec	Nicholas.Ethier@forces.gc.ca
4	NFIU – Maj Nadine Tischhauser	JHQ	10 Dec	Michael.Minor@international.gc.ca
5	CDA – Col Michael Minor	Canadian Embassy	10 Dec	Michael.Minor@international.gc.ca
6	NSE – LCol Kevin Ramsay	Ādaži	11 Dec	Kevin.Ramsay@forces.gc.ca
7	CIS – LCol Bryan Blyth	Ādaži	11 Dec	Brian.Blyth@forces.gc.ca
8	Comd TFL – Col Éric LaForest	Ādaži	11 Dec	Eric.LaForest@forces.gc.ca
9	eFP BG – Maj Dan Hogan	Ādaži	12 Dec	Daniel.Hogan@forces.gc.ca
10	AT – LCol Vincent Kirstein	Ādaži	12 Dec	Vincent.Kirstein@forces.gc.ca
11	TFL Ops and Plans – Maj Jeremy Hiltz	JHQ	12 Dec	Jeremy.Hiltz@forces.gc.ca
12	TFL J2 – Maj David Henry	JHQ	13 Dec	David.Henry@forces.gc.ca
13	Force Pro and Cyber – LCdr Susan Leitch, Capt Dominic Pelletier	JHQ	13 Dec	Susan.Leitch@forces.gc.ca Dominic.Pelletier@forces.gc.ca
14	Comd TFL – Col Éric LaForest	JHQ	13 Dec	Eric.LaForest@forces.gc.ca

9. VISIT PROGRAMME

Table 2 – VISIT Programme

Monday, 9 December 2019				
Dress: Travel Clothes		Time Difference: Ottawa +6/Ottawa +7		Temp: Low: °C High: °C POP:
Time	Activity	Location	Attendance	Remarks
0630	Arrive at FRA	Frankfurt Airport	All CJAT team members	Flight Number AC872
1055	Depart FRA			Flight Number AC9343
1400	Arrive at RIX	Riga International Airport	All CJAT team members	Flight number AC9343. Team to obtain rental vehicle and navigate under own direction to hotel. Vehicle plate number TBC.
1515	Check-In	Park Inn by Radisson Residence Riga Barona	All CJAT team members	Baggage drop & quick change into combats.
1515-1730	Admin Time		All CJAT team members	
1730-1800	Transit to Dinner		All CJAT team members	
1800-	Dinner	Folksclubs Ala Pagrabs	TFL Info Ops Plans, All CJAT team members	
Tuesday, 10 December 2019				
Dress: Combats		Time Difference: Ottawa +7		Temp: Low: °C High: °C POP:
Time	Activity	Location	Attendance	Remarks
0710-0740	Transit to JHQ	Krustabaznīcas iela 9	All CJAT team members	Long travel time accounts for traffic
0745-0800	Office Call with Comd TFL	JHQ – Fishbowl	TFL Comd, TFL DComd, TFSM, All CJAT team members	
0800-1000	Roundtable with TFL STRATCOM	JHQ-TBC	TFL STRATCOM, TFL PAO, TFL Info Ops, TFL Info Ops Plans, All CJAT team members	J8 Conf Rm
1000-1200	Discussion with J5-2	JHQ-TBC	TFL J5-2, All CJAT team members	J8 Conf Rm
1200-1250	Lunch	Oasis Cafe	All CJAT team members	
1300-1430	NFIU 101 Brief/ Discussion on Op TRACTABLE	NFIU Building	All available NFIU Pers, All CJAT team members	NFIU will RV with you in TFL HQ Lobby.

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CJAT

1430-1500	Transit to Embassy		All CJAT team members	
1500-1630	Meet with CDA	Baznīcas iela 20/22	CDA, CDA AA, All CJAT team members	
1630-1645	Transit to Hotel	Park Inn by Radisson Residence Rīga Barona	All CJAT team members	
1645-	Admin Time		All CJAT team members	
1515-1730	Admin Time		All CJAT team members	
1730-1800	Transit to Dinner		All CJAT team members	
1800-	Dinner	Folksclubs Ala Pagrabs	TFL Info Ops Plans, All CJAT team members	

Wednesday, 11 December 2019

Dress: Combats		Time Difference: Ottawa +7		Temp: Low: °C High: °C POP:
Time	Activity	Location	Attendance	Remarks
0715-0815	Transit to daži		All CJAT team members	Long travel time accounts for traffic. Confirm linkup procedures for gaining access & locating meeting.
0830-1000	Roundtable with eFP BG NSE	daži –Conf Rm A-2-12	Comd NSE, NSE DComd, All CJAT team members	Held in Conf Rm A-2-12
1100-1200	Discussion with LAAT	daži - Conf Rm A-2-12	LCol Kirstein, All CJAT team members	LCol Kirstein only. Held in Conf Rm A-2-12
1200-1300	Lunch	At Restaurant in daži	All CJAT team members	
1300-1500	Roundtable with CIS Sqn	daži –A1-1-16	OC CIS Sqn and 2IC CIS Sqn, All CJAT team members	
1600-1700	Transit to Hotel	Park Inn by Radisson Residence Rīga Barona	All CJAT team members	
1700-	Admin Time		All CJAT team members	

ASSESSMENT REPORT: LATVIA - OP REASSURANCE

CJAT

Thursday, 12 December 2019

Dress: Combats		Time Difference: Ottawa +7		Temp: Low: °C	High: °C	POP:
Time	Activity	Location	Attendance	Remarks		
0700-0800	Transit to daži		All CJAT team members	Long travel time accounts for traffic. Confirm linkup procedures for gaining access & locating meeting.		
0800-1200	Roundtable with eFP BG Staff	daži-TBC	eFP BG COS, RSM, OC CSS, 2IC CSS, A/ S1, S2, S3 Ops, S4, S5/OC CS, S5-2, S6, Dep S7, S8/QM, S9/ Ch LO, All CJAT team members	Comd Conf Rm – A2-2-04		
1200-1300	Lunch	At Restaurant in daži	All CJAT team members			
1300-1400	Transit to JHQ	Krustabazn cas iela 9	All CJAT team members			
1400-1500	Admin Time		All CJAT team members			
1500-1700	Roundtable with TFL J3	JHQ - TBC	TFL J3, TFL J3 Ops, All CJAT team members	J8 Conf Rm		
1700-1730	Transit to Hotel	Park Inn by Radisson Residence Riga Barona	All CJAT team members			
1730-	Admin Time		All CJAT team members			

Friday, 13 December 2019

Temp: Low: °C	High: °C	POP:	Time Difference: Ottawa +7		Temp: Low: °C	High: °C	POP:
Location	Attendance	Remarks	Attendance	Remarks			
0715-0800	Transit to JHQ	Krustabazn cas iela 9	All CJAT team members	Long travel time accounts for traffic			
0800-1000	Brief & Roundtable with TFL J2	JHQ -TBC	TFL J2, J2 Ops/Plans, J2 SIGINT, All CJAT team members	Rezekne Rm			
1000-1200	TFL Cyber/ ForcePro Roundtable	JHQ -TBC	TFL J3 Cyber, FP IC, All CJAT team members	J8 Conf Rm			
1200-1530	Admin Time	JHQ	All CJAT team members				
1530-1700	Outbrief with Comd TFL	JHQ -Fishbowl	Comd TFL, DComd TFL, TFSM, All CJAT team members				
1700-1730	Transit to Hotel	Park Inn by Radisson Residence Riga Barona	All CJAT team members				
1730-	Admin Time		All CJAT team members				

ASSESSMENT REPORT: LATVIA - OP REASSURANCE

CJAT

Saturday, 14 December 2019

Dress: Combats		Time Difference: Ottawa +7		Temp: Low: °C	High: °C	POP:
Time	Activity	Location	Attendance	Remarks		
0500	Checkout	Park Inn by Radisson Residence Riga Barona	All CJAT team members			
0730	Depart RIX	Riga International Airport	All CJAT team members	Flight Number OS7028		
0835	Arrive VIE	Vienna International Airport	All CJAT team members			
1025	Depart VIE		All CJAT team members	Flight Number AC899		





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